Abstract-We develop a low-complexity polar coding scheme for the discrete memoryless broadcast channel with confidential messages under strong secrecy and randomness constraints. Our scheme extends previous work by using an optimal rate of uniform randomness in the stochastic encoder, and avoiding assumptions regarding the symmetry or degraded nature of the channels. The price paid for these extensions is that the encoder and the decoders are required to share a secret seed of negligible size and to increase the block length through chaining. We also highlight a close conceptual connection between the proposed polar coding scheme and a random binning proof of the secrecy capacity region.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
ITH the renewed interest for information-theoretic security, there have been several attempts to develop low-complexity coding schemes achieving the fundamental secrecy limits of the wiretap channel models. In particular, explicit coding schemes based on low-density parity-check codes [2] - [4] , polar codes [5] - [8] , and invertible extractors [9] , [10] have been successfully developed for special cases of Wyner's model [11] , in which the channels are at least required to be symmetric. The recently introduced chaining techniques for polar codes provide, however, a convenient way to construct explicit low-complexity coding schemes for a variety of information-theoretic channel models [12] without any restrictions on the channels.
In this paper, we develop a low-complexity polar coding scheme for the broadcast channel with confidential messages [13] . We do not make degradation or symmetry assumptions on the communication channel. Moreover, rather than view randomness as a free resource, which could be used to simulate random numbers at arbitrary rate with no cost, we adopt the point of view put forward in [14] and [15] , in which any randomness used for stochastic encoding must be explicitly accounted for. In particular, our proposed polar coding scheme exploits the optimal rate of randomness identified in [14] and provides, in addition, a polar coding construction to perform channel prefixing.
Results related to the present work have been independently and concurrently developed in [16] and [17] , whose main differences can be summarized as follows. Unlike [17] , our coding scheme does not require that a non-negligible amount of common randomness is shared between the legitimate users as in [18, Sec. III-A], and unlike [16] , our coding scheme does not rely on [18, Th. 3] and existence, through averaging, of certain deterministic maps. Moreover, in contrast to [16] and [17] , we consider randomness as a resource and use the optimal amount of local randomness for the stochastic encoder (see Section V-B), we consider auxiliary random variables with non-binary alphabets to achieve the entire region in Theorem 1 (see Lemma 7 and Remark 6), and we do not assume that channel prefixing can be performed perfectly (see Section IV-C). Note also that [17] only considers weak secrecy. Consequently, our coding scheme and proofs are different from [16] and [17] . Remark also that, in our encoding scheme, we do not use maximum a posteriori (MAP) decisions 1 in the same way as in [16] and [17] . When specialized to Wyner's wiretap model, our scheme is also related to [7] , but with a number of notable distinctions. Specifically, while no pre-shared secret seed is required in [7] , the coding scheme therein relies on a twolayer construction for which no efficient code construction is presently known [7, Sec. 3.3] . In contrast, our coding scheme requires a pre-shared secret seed, but at the benefit of only using a single layer of polarization.
We summarize a comparison between our result specialized to the wiretap channel model and [7] , [16] , [17] in Figure 1 .
We summarize our contributions as follows.
• For the broadcast channel with confidential messages, we propose an explicit low-complexity and capacity achieving coding scheme under strong secrecy. Moreover, we do not make symmetry or degradation assumptions on the communication channel. Our result particularizes to the wiretap channel model to also provide an explicit Fig. 1 . Summary of differences between the present work and related polar coding schemes for arbitrary discrete memoryless wiretap channels [7] , [16] , [17] . 1) holds when the coding scheme is explicit and does not rely on existence, through averaging, of certain deterministic maps as in [18, Th. 3] , 2) holds when the coding scheme does not rely on a nonnegligible amount of common randomness shared between the legitimate users as in [18, Sec. III .A], 3) holds when strong secrecy is considered, 4) holds when non-binary auxiliary random variables are considered -see Lemma 7, 5) holds when the optimal amount of local randomness is used at the encoder, 6) holds when it is not assumed that channel prefixing can be perfectly performed, 7) holds when an efficient code construction is known.
low-complexity and capacity achieving coding scheme under strong secrecy. 2 • To the best of our knowledge, the parallel between random binning and polar codes made in the manuscript does not explicitly appear elsewhere. This conceptual consideration also has direct implications for the study of our coding scheme. Specifically, it stresses the fact that the distribution induced by the encoder must be precisely analyzed to rigorously assess reliability and secrecy.
• We develop a scheme that uses the minimal amount of local randomness required in the stochastic encoding.
• We consider polar coding for channel prefixing and do not assume that this operation can be perfectly realized. The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formally introduces the notation and the model under investigation. Section III develops a random binning proof of the results in [14] , which serves as a guideline for the design of the polar coding scheme. Section IV describes the proposed polar coding scheme, while Section V provides its detailed analysis. Section VI offers some concluding remarks.
II. BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES AND CONSTRAINED RANDOMIZATION
A. Notation
We define the integer interval a, b , as the set of integers between a and b . For n ∈ N and N 2 n , we let G n 1 0 1 1 ⊗n be the source polarization transform defined in [20] . Let the components of a vector, X 1:N , of size N, be denoted by superscripts, i.e., X 1:N (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X N ). For any set of indices I ⊆ 1, N , we define X 1:N [I] {X i } i∈I . We also use the notation S c to the denote the complement in 1, N of any subset S of 1, N . Unless specified otherwise, capital letters designate random variables, whereas lowercase letters designate realizations of associated O is a common message that must be reconstructed by both Bob and Eve. S is a confidential message that must be reconstructed by Bob and kept secret from Eve. M is a private message that Alice wishes to send to Bob without secrecy constraint, i.e., M is not required to be reconstructed by Eve and is not required to be kept secret from Eve. R represents an additional randomization sequence used at the encoder. random variables, e.g., x is a realization of the random variable X. When the context makes clear that we are dealing with vectors, we write X N in place of X 1:N . Let V(·, ·) and D(·||·) denote the variational distance and the divergence, respectively, between two distributions. Finally, we define the indicator function 1{ω}, which is equal to 1 if the predicate ω is true and 0 otherwise.
B. Channel Model and Capacity Region
We consider the problem of secure communication over a discrete memoryless broadcast channel (X , p Y Z|X , Y, Z) illustrated in Figure 2 . The marginal probabilities p Y |X and p Z |X define two Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMCs) (X , p Y |X , Y) and (X , p Z |X , Z), which we refer to as Bob's channel and Eve's channel, respectively. 
for the broadcast channel is measured in terms of its probability of error
and its leakage of information about the confidential message to Eve
The achievable region R BCC is defined as the closure of the set of all achievable rate quadruples.
Remark 2: We require strong secrecy, as opposed to weak secrecy which would require
Weak secrecy can often be analyzed through an astute use of Fano's inequality [21] . Strong secrecy usually requires more involved proof techniques but is perhaps a more meaningful secrecy metric as discussed in [22] . The exact characterization of R BCC was obtained in [14] . Theorem 1 [14] : R BCC is the closed convex set consisting of the quadruples
R R I (X; Z |V ).
The main contribution of the present work is to develop a polar coding scheme achieving the rates in R BCC .
III. A BINNING APPROACH TO CODE DESIGN: FROM RANDOM BINNING TO POLAR BINNING
In this section, we argue that our construction of polar codes for the broadcast channel with confidential messages is essentially the constructive counterpart of a random binning proof of the region R BCC . While random coding is often the natural tool to address channel coding problems, random binning is already found in [23] to establish the strong secrecy of the wiretap channel, and is the tool of choice in quantum information theory [24] ; there has also been a renewed interest for random binning proofs in multi-user information theory, motivated in part by [25] . In Section III-A, we sketch a random binning proof of the characterization of R BCC established in [14] , which may be viewed as a refinement of the analysis in [25] to obtain a more precise characterization of the stochastic encoder. Section III-A does not involve polar codes and does not contain new results, but we use this alternative proof in Section III-B to obtain high-level insight into the construction of polar codes. The main benefit is to clearly highlight the crucial steps of the construction in Section IV and of its analysis in Section V. In particular, the rate conditions developed in the random binning proof of Section III-A directly translate into the definition of the polarization sets in Section III-B.
A. Information-Theoretic Random Binning
Information-theoretic random binning proofs rely on the following well-known lemmas -see, for instance, [23] - [25] for a proof. We use the notation δ(N) to denote an unspecified positive function of N that vanishes as N goes to infinity. 
Lemma 2 (Privacy Amplification, Channel Intrinsic Randomness, Output Statistics of Random Binning): Consider a DMS
One may obtain more explicit results regarding the convergence to zero in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, but we ignore this for brevity.
The principle of a random binning proof of Theorem 1 is
and to assign two types of indices to source sequences by random binning. The first type identifies subsets of sequences that play the roles of codebooks, while the second type labels sequences with indices that can be thought of as messages. As explained in the next paragraphs, the crux of the proof is to show that the binning can be "inverted," so that the sources may be generated from independent choices of uniform codebooks and messages.
1) Common Message Encoding:
We introduce two indices ψ U ∈ 1, 2 Nρ U and o ∈ 1, 2 N R O by random binning on u N such that: 
The resulting joint distribution is again a close approximation of p V N U N V |U S M , so that the scheme inherits the reliability and secrecy properties of the random binning scheme upon disclosing ψ V |U .
3) Channel Prefixing: Finally, we introduce the indices ψ X |V ∈ 1, 2 Nρ X|V and r ∈ 1, 2 N R R by random binning on x N such that 
4) Chaining to De-Randomize the Codebooks:
The downside of the schemes described earlier is that they require sharing the indices ψ U , ψ V |U , and ψ X |V , identifying the codebooks between Alice, Bob, and Eve; however, the rate cost may be amortized by reusing the same indices over sequences of k blocks. Specifically, the union bound shows that the average error probability over k blocks is at most k times that of an individual block, and a hybrid argument shows that the information leakage over k blocks is at most k times that of an individual block. Consequently, for k and N large enough, the impact on the transmission rates is negligible.
5) Total Amount of Randomness:
The total amount of randomness required for encoding includes not only the explicit random numbers used for channel prefixing but also all the 5 
By Lemma 1 with the substitutions
6 By Lemma 2 with the substitutions
, and with the substitutions
7 By Lemma 2 with the substitutions R ← ρ X |V , (X N ) ← X |V , and Z ← (V, Z ). 8 By Lemma 2 with the substitutions
randomness required in the stochastic encoding to approximate the source distribution. One can show that the rate randomness specifically used in the stochastic encoding is negligible; we omit the proof of this result for random binning, but this is analyzed precisely for polar codes in Section V.
By combining all the rate constraints above and performing Fourier-Motzkin elimination, one recovers the rates in Theorem 1.
B. Binning With Polar Codes
The main observation to translate the analysis of Section III-A into a polar coding scheme is that Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 have the following counterparts in terms of source polarization.
Lemma 3 (Adapted From [20] 
In other words, the high entropy bits in positions H X |Y play the same role as the random binning index in Lemma 1. However, note that the construction of x 1:N in Lemma 3 is explicitly stochastic.
Lemma 4 (Adapted From [26] 
The very high entropy bits in positions V X |Z therefore play the same role as the random binning index in Lemma 2.
Intuitively, information theoretic constraints resulting from Lemma 1 translate into the use of "high entropy" sets H, while those resulting from Lemma 2 translate into the use of "very high entropy" sets V. However, unlike the indices resulting from random binning, the high entropy and very high entropy sets may not necessarily be aligned, and the precise design of a polar coding scheme requires more care.
In the remainder of the paper, we consider a DMS
, with q (U ) the smallest prime number larger than q (X ) + 3, and |V| = q (V ) , with q (V ) the smallest prime number larger than (q (X ) + 3)(q (X ) + 1). We also assume without loss of generality 
If we could guarantee 10 that 
If the inclusion H V |U Y ⊆ V V |U Z were true, 11 then we would place random q (V ) -ary symbols identifying the codebook in positions H V |U Y , random q (V ) -ary symbols describing the secret message in positions
-ary symbols describing the private message in positions V V |U \ V V |U Z , use successive cancellation encoding 10 In general, one only has V U ⊆ H U , H U |Y ⊆ H U , and H U |Z ⊆ H U . 11 In general, we only have
to compute the q (V ) -ary symbols in positions V c V |U and approximate the source distribution, and use chaining to amortize the rate cost of the q (V ) -ary symbols in positions H V |U Y . This is unfortunately again not directly possible in general, and one needs to exploit chaining to realign the indices, and transmit the q (V ) -ary symbols in positions
V |U separately and secretly to Bob. The precise coding scheme is detailed in Section IV-B.
3) Channel Prefixing: Finally, define the polar transform of X 1:N as T 1:N X 1:N G n and the associated sets
Note that V X |V ⊆ V X |V Z . One performs channel prefixing by placing random q (X ) -ary symbols identifying the code in positions V X |V Z , random q (X ) -ary symbols describing the randomization sequence in positions V X |V \ V X |V Z , and using successive cancellation encoding to compute the q (X ) -ary symbols in positions V c X |V and approximate the source distribution. Chaining is finally used to amortize the cost of randomness for describing the code. The precise coding scheme is detailed in Section IV-C.
Remark 3: Although we only formally prove it for the model considered in this paper, we conjecture that any results obtained from random binning could be derived using source polarization as a constructive and low-complexity alternative. This conjecture has been shown to hold for secret-key generation [26] , uniform compression [27, , strong coordination [28] , and channel resolvability [28] .
IV. POLAR CODING SCHEME
In this section, we describe the details of the polar coding scheme resulting from the discussion of the previous section. Recall that the joint probability distribution p U V XY Z of the original source is fixed and defined as in Section III-B. As alluded to earlier, we perform the encoding over k blocks of size N. We use the subscript i ∈ 1, k to denote random variables associated to encoding Block i . The chaining constructions corresponding to the encoding of the common, secret, and private messages, and randomization sequence, are described in Section IV-A, Section IV-B, and Section IV-C, respectively. Although each chaining is described independently, all messages should be encoded in every block before moving to the next. Specifically, in every block i ∈ 1, k − 1 , Alice successively encodes the common message, the secret and private messages, and performs channel prefixing, before she moves to the next block i + 1. 
, which is non-uniform and has negligible rate, is transmitted separately to Bob and Eve. U 1 is also transmitted separately to Bob and Eve -note that the rate of this transmission vanishes to zero as the number of blocks k increases.
provide a precise analysis of the variational distance between the distribution of the "tilded" random variables and the targeted distributions in Section V-A.
A. Common Message Encoding
In addition to the polarization sets defined in (1)- (4) we also define
Note that A U Y Z exists because
and since we have assumed I (U ; Y ) I (U ; Z ), one can show with Lemmas 6, 7,
The encoding procedure with chaining is summarized in Figure 3 . In Block 1, the encoder forms 
where the components of o 1 have been indexed by the set of indices I U Y for convenience, so that
The random q (U ) -ary symbols that identify the codebook and that are required to reconstruct A are publicly transmitted to both Bob and Eve. Note that, unlike in the random binning proof, the use of polarization forces us to distinguish the part U 1 that is nearly uniform from the part U 1 that is not. We show later that the rate cost of this additional transmission is negligible. We also write
Both
where
We will retransmit O 1,2 in the next block. Finally, we compute
In Block i ∈ 2, k − 1 , the encoder forms 
The random q (U ) -ary symbols that identify the codebook and that are required to reconstruct
Note that the q (U ) -ary symbols in U i are reusing some of the q (U ) -ary symbols in U 1 ; however, it is necessary to make the q (U ) -ary symbols U i available to both Bob and Eve, to enable the reconstruction of O i -See Remark 5.i. We show later that this entails a negligible rate cost. Finally, we write
and we retransmit O i,2 in the next block. We finally compute
Finally, the encoder forms 
The random q (U ) -ary symbols that identify the codebook and that are required to reconstruct 
The public transmission of (
to perform the reconstruction of the common message is taken into account in the secrecy analysis in Section V.
B. Secret and Private Message Encoding
In addition to the polarization set defined in (5)-(8), we also define
The encoding procedure with chaining is summarized in Fig. 4 .
In Block 1, the encoder forms 
13 B V |UY can be chosen as any subset of V V |U Z , what matters is that B V |UY is a subset of V V |U Z and inherits its properties. 
) is the information necessary to the legitimate receiver to recover B 1:N i . Note also that V |U i is uniform and repeated in Block i + 1, whereas
, whose rate is negligible, is non-uniform and secretly transmitted to the legitimate receiver with a one-time pad. Finally,
is also secretly transmitted to the legitimate receiver with a one-time pad, and the rate of this transmission vanishes to zero as the number of blocks k increases.
where the components of s 1 and m 1 have been indexed by the set of indices V V |U Z and M U V Z , respectively. Consequently, note that
The random q (V ) -ary symbols that identify the codebook required for reconstruction are those in positions H V |U Y , which we split as 
Note that
The random q (V ) -ary symbols that identify the codebook required for reconstruction are those in positions H V |U Y , which we split as
is not, so that we reuse
in the next block but we share securely between Alice and Bob. We show later that the cost of sharing
is negligible. We then define
In Block k, Alice securely shares 
C. Channel Prefixing
The channel prefixing procedure with chaining is illustrated in Fig. 5. 14 Note that a basic construction that achieves the symmetric capacity of the channel is sufficient here, as the length of the sequence transmitted is negligible compared to the overall blocklength k N.
In 
where the components of r 1 have been indexed by the set of indices V X |V \V X |V Z , so that
The random q (X ) -ary symbols that identify the codebook are those in position V X |V Z , which we denote
Finally, compute 
where the components of r i have been indexed by the set of indices V X |V \V X |V Z , so that
Note that the random q (X ) -ary symbols describing the codebook are
and are reused from the previous block. Finally, define 
D. Decoding
Reconstruction of the common message by Bob and Eve follows the idea of [12] , i.e., backward decoding for Eve and forward decoding for Bob. More specifically, the decoding procedure is as follows. 16 Eve runs the successive cancellation decoder for source coding with side information using Z 17 and uses this estimate along with Z 
1) Reconstruction of the Common Message by
1:N k and A 1:N k [H U |Z ] to form A 1:N k , an estimate of A 1:N k . For i ∈ 1, k − 1 , Eve estimates A 1:N k−i [H U |Z ] with ( U 1 , A 1:N k−i+1 [A U Y Z ], U k−i ),V |U k , V |U k , Y 1:N k , U 1:N k ),V |U k−1 B 1:N k [V V |U Y ] of V |U k−1 is formed. For i ∈ 1, k − 1 , given ( V |U k−i , V |U k−i , Y 1:N k−i , U 1:N k−i ),
V. ANALYSIS OF THE POLAR CODING SCHEME
We now analyze in details the characteristics and performances of the polar coding scheme described in Section IV. Specifically, we show the following. 15 Observe that
Theorem 2: Consider a discrete memoryless broadcast channel (X , p Y Z|X , Y, Z). The coding scheme of Section III,
[V U \(I UY ∪ A UY Z )] ∪ A UY Z ∪ [(H U |Y ∪ H U |Z )\V U ] ⊃ H U |Y . 16 Using that A UY Z is a subset of I U Z \I UY , observe that [V U \(A UY Z ∪ (I UY ∩ I U Z ))] ∪ [(H U |Y ∪ H U |Z )\V U ] ⊃ H U |Z . 17 Using that A UY Z is a subset of I U Z \I UY , observe that [V U \(I UY ∪ A UY Z )] ∪ [I UY \I U Z ] ∪ [(H U |Y ∪ H U |Z )\V U ] ⊃ H U |Z .
which operates over k encoding blocks of length N and whose complexity is O(k N log N) achieves the region R BCC .
The result of Theorem 2, follows in four steps. First, we show that the polar coding scheme of Section IV approximates the statistics of the original DMS (U×V×X ×Y×Z, p U V XY Z ) from which the polarization sets were defined. Second, we show that the various messages rates are indeed those in R BCC . Third, we show that the probability of decoding error vanishes with the block length. Finally, we show that the information leakage vanishes with the block length.
A. Approximation of Original DMS Statistics
Recall that the vectors A 
However, the following lemma shows that the joint distributions are close to one another, which is crucial for the subsequent reliability and secrecy analysis.
Lemma 5: For i ∈ 1, k , we have
Combining the three previous inequalities, we obtain
V( p U 1:N V 1:N X 1:N Y 1:N Z 1:N , p U 1:N i V 1:N i X 1:N i Y 1:N i Z 1:N i ) δ ( P) N . where δ ( P) N √ 2 log 2 √ Nδ N (2 √ 2 + √ 3). Proof: See Appendix A.
B. Transmission Rates
We now analyze the rate of common message, confidential message, private message, and randomization sequence, used at the encoder, as well as the different sum rates and the rate of additional information sent to Bob and Eve. We will use the following lemmas. 
We have 
We have
Proof: See Appendix F. Remark 6: Although the case q = 2 first appeared in [18] and [34, Lemma 1] , Lemma 7 has not appeared anywhere to the best of our knowledge. A weaker result has been shown in [33, Th. 3.4] , specifically, for all > 0,
1) Common Message Rate:
The overall rate R O of common information transmitted satisfies
where we have used Lemma 6 and Lemma 7. Since we also have R O
2) Confidential Message Rate: First, observe that
Then, the overall rate R S of secret information transmitted is
3) Private Message Rate: The overall rate R M of private information transmitted is
where we have used Lemma 7.
4) Randomization Rate:
The randomness used in the stochastic encoder includes the randomization sequence for channel prefixing, as well as the randomness required to identify the codebooks and run the successive cancellation encoding. Using Lemma 7, we find that the rate required to identify the codebook for the common message is
Similarly, the rate required to identify the codebook for the secret and private messages corresponds to the rate of (
, which is transmitted to Bob to allow him to reconstruct B
where we have used Lemma 6. The randomization sequence rate used in channel prefixing is
where we have used Lemma 7. Finally, we justify that the rate of uniform randomness required for successive cancellation encoding in (11)- (17) is negligible in Appendix B. Hence, the overall randomness rate R R used at the encoder is asymptotically
R R N→∞,k→∞
− −−−−−−− → I (X; Z |V ).(21)
5) Sum Rates:
By (20) and (21), the sum of the private message rate R M and the randomness rate R R is asymptotically
where (a) and (b) hold by U − V − X − Z .
Moreover, by (18), (19) , and (20), the sum of the common message rate R O , the private message rate R M , and the confidential message rate R S is asymptotically
6) Seed Rate:
The rate of the secret sequence that must be shared between the legitimate users to initialize the coding scheme is
where we have used Lemma 6 and Lemma 7.
Moreover the rate of public communication from Alice to both Bob and Eve is
C. Average Probability of Error
We first show that Eve and Bob can reconstruct the common messages O 1:N 1:k with small error probability. For i ∈ 1, k , consider an optimal coupling [35, Lemma 3.6] 
where (a) follows from the error probability of source coding with side information [20] and the union bound, (b) holds by the optimal coupling and Lemma 5, (c) holds by induction since we have shown that for any i ∈ 2, k ,
holds similarly to the previous inequalities. We thus have by the union bound and (22)
We similarly obtain for Eve
Next, we show how Bob can recover the secret and private messages. Informally, the decoding process of the confidential and private messages (M 1:k , S 1:k ) for Bob is as follows. Reconstruction starts with Block k. Given ( 
Define also for i ∈ 1, k − 1 ,
by construction, (c) follows from the error probability of lossless source coding with side information [20] , (d) holds by the optimal coupling and Lemma 5, (e) holds by (22) , ( f ) holds by induction, (g) is obtained similarly to the previous inequalities.
Hence,
D. Information Leakage
A Bayesian graph that describes dependencies between all the variables involved in the coding scheme of Section III is given in Figure 6 . For the secrecy analysis, we must upper bound
Note that we have introduced ( U 1 , U 1:k ), since these random variables have been made available to Eve. Recall that U 1:k is additional information transmitted to Bob and Eve to reconstruct the common messages O 1:k . Recall also that U 1 ⊃ U i , i ∈ 2, k , as it is the randomness reused among all the blocks that allows the transmission of the common messages O 1:k . We start by proving that secrecy holds for a given block i ∈ 2, k in the following lemma. where
is reused from the previous block. Finally, U i is information, whose rate is negligible, sent to Bob and Eve to allow them to reconstruct the common messages.
Lemma 8: For i ∈ 1, k and N large enough,
, and
Recall that for channel prefixing in the encoding process, we reuse some randomness X |V 1 among all the blocks so that
. This fact will be useful in the secrecy analysis of the overall scheme.
Lemma 9: For i ∈ 2, k and N large enough,
N is defined as in Lemma 8. Proof: See Appendix D. Using Lemmas 8 and 9, we show in the following lemma a recurrence relation that will make the secrecy analysis over all blocks easier.
Lemma 10:
We then have
N , where (a) follows from Lemma 8, (b) follows from independence of S 2:k and the random variables of Block 1.
Hence, strong secrecy follows from Lemma 10 because
VI. CONCLUSION
Our proposed polar coding scheme for the broadcast channel with confidential messages provides an explicit lowcomplexity scheme achieving the capacity region of [14] , and uses the optimal amount of local randomness at the stochastic encoder. Although the presence of auxiliary random variables and the need to re-align polarization sets through chaining introduces rather involved notation, the coding scheme is conceptually close to a binning proof of the capacity region, in which polarization is used in place of random binning. We believe that a systematic use of this connection will effectively allow one to translate many results proved with output statistics of random binning [25] into polar coding schemes.
It is arguable whether the resulting schemes are truly practical, as the block length N and the number of blocks k are likely to be fairly large. Although only random seeds with negligible rate need to be shared between the transmitter and receivers, much work remains to be done to circumvent the need for such seeds.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 5
In the following, for joint probability distributions p XY and q XY defined over X × Y, we write the conditional relative entropy as
We show the first three inequalities of Lemma 5 in order. Let i ∈ 2, k − 1 . We have
where (a) holds by invertibility of G n , (b) holds by the chain rule for divergence [36] , (c) holds by (12) , (d) holds by (12) and uniformity of O i , O i−1,2 , and U 1 , (e) holds by definition of V U .
Similarly for i ∈ {1, k}, using (11) and (13) we also have
Let i ∈ 2, k . We have
where (a) holds by the chain rule, (b) holds by (15), (c) holds by (15) and uniformity of
Then,
where (a) holds by invertibility of G n , (b) holds by the chain rule, (c) holds by (24) , (25) , and (26) . Similarly, using (25) , and (14), we have
where (a) holds by the chain rule, (b) holds by (17) , (c) holds by (17) and uniformity of the q (X ) -ary symbols in T
where (a) holds by invertibility of G n , (b) holds by the chain rule, (c) holds by (27) and (29) . Similarly, using (16) and (28), we have
Note that, as remarked in [37] , upper-bounding the divergence with a chain rule is easier than directly upper-bounding the variational distance as in [18] and [38] .
Using (24), (25), (27) , (28), (30), (31), we now prove the last inequality in Lemma 5. Let i ∈ 1, k . Because of the Markov chains
Hence, since p 
We also have
where (a) holds by the triangle inequality, and (b) holds by (27) , (28) and (30), (31) using Pinsker's inequality. Finally, we have
where (a) holds by the triangle inequality and Equation (32), (b) holds by (27) , (28), and (33) using Pinsker's inequality. (11)- (17) We here justify that the rate of uniform randomness required for successive cancellation encoding in (11)- (17) is negligible. We will make use of the following lemma.
APPENDIX B RANDOMIZATION IN
Lemma 11: Let N ∈ N, and let J N be a subset of 1, N such that
where X and Y are finite alphabets. Let p U denote the uniform distribution over X . We call a sample drawn from p U a coin toss. Using the interval algorithm [40] and assuming that for j ∈ J N , y j is drawn from p Y j , one can sample from p X j |Y j =y j using L j independent coin tosses such that for any > 0 with probability arbitrarily close to one as N goes to infinity,
Proof: For any j ∈ J N , using the interval algorithm by [40, Th. 3] , one can sample from p X j |Y j =y j using L j independent coin tosses with an expected number of coin tosses upper-bounded as follows.
From (35), we obtain the trivial upper bound
We thus have
and we conclude with Markov's inequality. We start by studying the rate of uniform randomness required for successive cancellation encoding in (11), (12) , and (13) . For any i ∈ 1, k , note that the random decisions in (11), (12) , and (13),
can be replaced, using the result in [19] , by
where (a
). Hence, the rate of uniform randomness required for successive cancellation encoding in (11), (12) , and (13) is negligible, with probability arbitrarily close to one, by Lemma 11 applied with the substitutions
where j ∈ V c U \H c U . The assumption of Lemma 11 is indeed satisfied since by Lemma 6 and Lemma 7,
Similarly, for any i ∈ 1, k , the random decisions in (14) and (15),
where (b
, and for any i ∈ 1, k , the random decisions in (16) and (17),
X |V , can be replaced, using the result in [19] , by
Hence, the rate of uniform randomness required for successive cancellation encoding in (14) - (17) is negligible, with probability arbitrarily close to one, by Lemma 11 applied with the substitutions
V |U \H c V |U , and by Lemma 11 applied with the substitutions [19] .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 8
We will make use of the following lemma. 
Then, we have
where (a) and (b) follow from the triangle inequality, (c) holds by hypothesis, (d) holds by Pinsker's inequality, (e) holds because using the fact that conditioning reduces entropy we have
We then obtain
where (a) holds by the triangle inequality, (b) holds by hypothesis, and (37) .
N by Lemma 5, we have by Lemma 12
Then, for N large enough by [41] ,
where we have used (39) and that x → x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small enough.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 9
With the substitution
where we have defined
Then, for N large enough,
where (a) holds by invertibility of G n , (b) holds by [41] , (c) holds (40) and because x → x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small enough.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF LEMMA 10 In the following, let ⊕ denote the modulo-q addition. We start with some definitions and recall some useful results for our proof.
For a source (X Y, p XY ) the Bhattacharyya source parameter is defined by [33] Z s (W ) 
where Recall also that for q-ary input symmetric channels, with q prime, we have the following result. 
The combination of (43) and (44) proves the lemma.
